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where the assembly prerogative is itself the most important liberty
being protected, the principal case presents as clear-cut an illustration of
it standing alone as can be found; but even here it is barely possible that
the conversation of the group was a large consideration in the judicial
disposition of the case. The Hague and DeJonge decisions, though
ostensibly based solely on the protection of assembly, both involved
freedom of speech in quite the same degree. Thus, the greater the
importance of the presence of speech or press elements, the greater
probably will be the influence imputed to assembly.
Historical analysis of the assembly right shows that the Articles of
Confederation contained no provision whatsoever for the exercise of
this privilege, while heated debate accompanied its inclusion in the present
Constitution."0 A conflict exists among the authoritative writers as to
whether or not this was a right in itself in the English common law."0
A seeming qualification on the scope of the assembly guaranty, though
little has been made of it, is found in both state and national consti-
tutions. "The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances" is the wording of the final
clause in Amendment I of the Federal Constitution, while the Ohio
Constitution, by Article I, Section 3, permits assemblage "to consult
for the common good; to instruct their Representatives; and to petition
the General Assembly for the redress of grievances." The exercise
of the assembly right has never been confined specifically to the ends
so expressly provided, yet the latitude given the preceding unqualified
rights of free speech and press has never been attained. If this be ex-
plainable on the basis that assembly is only a necessary prerequisite to
the other liberties, then the present decisions add greatly to the import-
ance which may be expected of the assembly guaranty in the future,
but do not accord it an independent status. J.J.F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- RECENT INTERPRETATION OF
OHIO'S LIMITATION ON INDEBTEDNESS
Constitutional and statutory limitations on the creation of indebted-
ness by state and municipality,' although generally reflecting in their
origin a sound and commendable fiscal policy, have in recent years given
I Annals of Cong. 759.
* 'Jarret and Mund, The Right of Assembly (931) 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. I.
'6 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (zd) ed. 1937) sec. 2364.
"There are . . . constitutional . . . statutory . . . and . . . charter provisions. (Some
provisions forbid) indebtedness in excess of a certain per cent of the value or assessed
value of the taxable property in the municipal area, and (others limit) indebtedness in
any one year to the income and revenue provided for such year, and (others contain)
both the first and second provisions."
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rise to numerous perplexing problems in the financing of the ever-
expanding activities of modern government.' Under American constitu-
tional theory a limitation such as that imposed upon Ohio municipalities
by force of legislative act3 can be modified through ordinary legislative
channels; but far greater obstacles face those who would adjust to the
seeming needs of the present-day mandatory restrictions imbedded in a
state's fundamental document. Such constitutional debt limitations were
the product of nineeenth century American growing pains which per-
haps reached their greatest intensity around the midpoint of that IO-
year span. Typical, seemingly, was the situation in Ohio, where 185o
found the state already heavily burdened with debt and its tax monies too
often going for questionable expenditures at the hands of public officers
of limited knowledge and experience.
At Ohio's Constitutional Convention of 185 1, these conditions were
colorfully portrayed by Henry H. Gregg, delegate from Columbiana
County: "The citizens of that part of the state in which I reside are
particularly tenacious upon the subject of public debt and taxation. They
have been taxed, and re-taxed and over-taxed, year after year, for the
benefits of other parts of the State and have never received anything in
return. And sir, we ask now, that debt-contracting, loan-laws, and
money-squandering may forever be put an end to-that the whole sys-
tem may be dug up by the roots and no single sprout ever be permitted to
ever be hung up around the necks of the people of this state again.
Leave no sprout to germinate into cplunder laws' and taxation--secure
the public treasury against all such drains, burdens, wastes, and plunder-
ing systems, so that one can at least rest secure in the future, and as if
there was a 'good time coming' when our taxes would be lessened, and
we finally be relieved of the intolerable debt and taxation which now
hangs upon us.""
With such sentiments evidently shared by the delegates generally,
the Convention came to agreement upon a two-way plan to steer Ohio
clear of further experiences with the rocky reefs of unsound fiscal policy.
To curtail expenditures of tax monies, and thus indirectly to limit the
rising tide of taxation, there were written into Ohio's new Constitution
Article XII, Sec. 6, and Article VIII, Sees. 4 and 6, all of which oper-
ated to cut off erstwhile state and local spending in aid of internal im-
provements. But unlike many state constitutions adopted at this time in
American political development, the Ohio document of 185 1 carried no
tax rate limitation; municipal taxing power was made subject to legisla-
2 See Legis. (1933) 18 Iowa L. Rev. 169.
a OHIo G.C. Sec. 2293-14.
4 1 Ohio Convention Debates (1851) 469. See also the discussion id, at 477.
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tide control by Article XIII, Sec. 6, while the state itself was left free.
Not until 1929 did Ohio incorporate into her organic act, as a part of
Article XII, Sec. 2, a millage limitation applicable alike to the state and
its political subdivisions. The Convention's second angle of attack was
directed specifically toward the debt "evil." Anticipating more recent
proponents of the pay-as-you-go theory, the delegates sought to eliminate
any possibility of imposition of unjust tax burdens by one generation
upon those to come. The result was Article VIII, Sec. I and 3, limiting
to $750,000 the aggregate amount of state indebtedness ordinarily pos-
sible,0 although by Article XIII, Sec. 6, determination of the debt limits
for municipalities was, as above observed, left to statute.
Constitutional provisions of the general Ohio pattern seemed, at the
time of their adoption in the nineteenth century, to constitute a satis-
factory solution to a serious situation. But wvithin a comparatively short
period the rapid development of the states and the changing c6 nception
of the place of government of American society had produced signs of
strain between what had been deemed desirable and what increasingly
appeared to be necessary. Extended reference to the enlarged activities
of state and local governments would be superfluous here; it suffices to
touch upon their entrance into social and economic regulation upon
the increased cost of manifold forms of institutional service demanded
of them, upon their entrance into such fields as utility operation
earlier regarded as the province of private enterprise. Those in con-
trol of government became ever more acutely aware of the grip of a
dilemma from which some form of escape became imperative. With
tax rate limitations this lay largely in the restricted application of such
limitations, which have always been framed as restrictions solely on ad
valorem taxation of property. Resort could be had, consequently, to
newer forms of taxation that were free of a specific maximum, although
judicial doctrine has found in due process or other concepts vaguer limi-
tations on them. But wvith debt limitations, any escape short of constitu-
tional amendment was not so readily apparent; solutions here have called
for a reappraisal of the purpose and intent which lay behind such provi-
'Article VIII, Sec. x, Ohio Constitution: The state may contract debts to supply
casual deficits or failures in revenues, or to meet expenses not otherwise provided for;
but the aggregate amount of such debts, direct and contingent, whether contracted by virtue
of one or more acts of the general assembly, or at different periods of time, shall never
exceed seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars; and the money, arising from the creation
of such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which it was obtained, or to repay the
debts so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever.
Article VIII, Sec. a: In addition to the above limited power, the state may con-
tract debts to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, defend the state in war, or to redeem
the present outstanding indebtedness of the state . ..
Article VIII, Sec. 3: Except the debts above specified in sections one and two
of this article, no debt whatever shall hereafter be created by or on behalf of the state.
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sions as Ohio's Article VIII, Secs. I and 3. By far the most general
escape which has resulted from this reappraisal is to be found in the
doctrine that bond issuances to finance self-liquidating projects, the cost
to be paid from pledged receipts, do not constitute a violation of the
constitutional debt maxima.'
These general escape devices have made their appearance in Ohio.
Because the tax rate limitation in Ohio was a late comer, methods of
restricting its effectiveness as a damper on increasing taxation had long
preceded it.' Save for the income tax, and even the use of it was incor-
porated into the proposed Bigelow Amendment of last fall, Ohio has
resorted to all the other major forms of enforced contribution to the
mounting cost of government, the limitations on which, where existent
at all, leave greater leeway than do the provisions of the present Article
XII, Sec. 2.8 And the state has resorted with success to the pledge of
receipts plan in the financing of projects of a clearly self-liquidating
character.' The controlling decision on this latter point is that of Kasch
v. Miller,"° in which the court sustained a statutory scheme for flood pre-
vention because the money borrowed for construction was to be repaid
through the sale or lease of the impounded waters or the power thereby
generated. Very recently the Supreme Court of Ohio, in State Bridge
Commission of Ohio v. Griffith,"' reapproved the Kasch decision and
sustained the issuance of refunding bonds by the Commission, because
there was no obligation on the part of the state to pay these bonds except
from bridge revenues. The court's reasoning in the Kasch case is re-
vealed in the following passage from the opinion: "An inspection of the
act, however, discloses that under no circumstances, and under no possi-
'Fox v. Bicknell, 193 Ind. 537, x45 N.E. 222 (1923); State ex rel. Hawkins v.
State Examiners, 97 Montana 44J, 35 P (zd) 1s6 (1934.) ; McClain v. Regents of
University, 124 Ore. 6z9, z65 Pac. 41 (X9ZS); Morgan v. Portage, 174 Wis. 588,
184. N.E. 376 (gzs); 96 A.L.R. 1385, 7z A.L.R. 687. Another escape device, bottomed
on a similar rationale, is the special assessment. For cases on this see: Quill v. Indian-
apolis, 124 Indiana Z92, 23 N.E. 788 (i89o); Waller v. Pritchard, 201 Iowa 364, 2oz
N.W. 770 (19z6); State v. Curtis, 319 Mo. 316, 4 S.W. (zd) 467 (19z8); Charlotte
v. American Trust Co., 159 N.C. 388, 74- S.E. io54 (sgsz); 33 A.L.R. 14 5.
"Indeed the history of the adoption of this form of limitation in 5929 indicates
that the provision was designed not to check all taxation as was the case earlier when ad
valorem exactions on property were the dominant form of state and local taxation, but to
shift the ever increasing burden from property to other tax subjects.
' To illustrate, privilege taxation in Ohio, whether by state or city, is subject to the
judicially found limitation that the tax cannot exceed the value of the privilege made the
subject of the exaction. Southern Gum Co. v. Laylin, 66 Ohio St. 578, 64 N.E. 564
(19oz); Saviers v. Smith, ioi Ohio St. 132, 1z8 N.E. z69 (9zo); Calerdin v. Freiberg,
129 Ohio St. 453, 195 N.E. 854 (935). But past litigation appears to indicate that
this restriction is quite fluid.
'Compare the provision of the present Article XVIII, Sec. xz, specifically authoriz-
ing municipalities to employ the pledge-of-receipts plan in the financing of public utilities
even though the municipality's statutory debt limit has been reached.
1o io4 Ohio St. z8x, z35 N.E. 813 (19zz).
21 36 Ohio St. 334, 25 N.E. (2d) 847, 16 Ohio Op. 467 (940).
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bility can the state be made to answer for any of the obligations created
by the act, by reason of the construction of such improvement.... The
debt created under the act is not a state debt; the bonds authorized there-
under entail no obligaion upon the state, which it is required legally or
morally to assume; the mortgage attached to no state property owned
by or purchased with revenues of the state. . . . This act provides that
the superintendent of public works shall be the supervising officer under
whom the improvements are made. . . .The legislature no doubt con-
siders it to be a wise public policy to place the supervision of the construc-
tion of the improvement under control of the state, and that the
payments therefore should be disbursed by its own officers."' 2
To follow the court on this proposition requires a parting with not
only the current dictionary view'3 of the meaning of debt but good Ohio
precedent as well. For in the early case of State v. Medbery'4 the Ohio
court, in condemning as beyond the debt limit a contractual arrangement
for canal repair that called for a total state expenditure of $1,375,000,
held that "the moment these contracts were executed, they created a
present obligation on the part of the state to pay money at a future
period."" It is judicial legerdemain to declare that, under the facts of
the Kascl; situation, there has been no creation of a state debt. But the
two cases can be brought into harmony by considering the source of
repayment in each in relation to the situation prompting adoption of the
debt maxima of Article VIII. In the early case, the debt was to be repaid
out of tax revenues; in the latter, from disposition of water and power
for a price. In public finance theory, these two sources of governmental
monies are carefully distinguished;'" it is just as dear that in adopting
Article VIII, Secs. I and 3, the delegates to the Ohio Constitutional
Convention of 185 1 were thinking of obligations that must be met
through general taxation. Measured by historical purpose as well as by
weight of precedent, the Kasch court arrived at the proper result, but
the basis upon which it predicated this result was tenuous.
Although the Kasch exception for self-liquidating projects has been
successfully relied upon to make possible state activity in significant
areas,'" there has remained the socially important problem of financing
SKa.-ch v. Miller, supra, note io, at 287-288, 135 N.E. at 854-S 5.
' "A sum of money due by certain and express agreement." Bouvier's Layw Dictionary
(3d rev. ed. 1914).
"7 Ohio St. 5zz (1857).
5
'Id. at 536.
', SELIGMAN, ESSAY$ o5 TAx.TION (ioth ed. 19zS) 400.
"On the strength of the Kasch decision the Attorney General ruled in 1933 that
the State of Ohio vaas in a position constitutionally to take advantage of a forest conserva-
tion program sponsored by the federal government, the state to repay the latter from
proceeds realized from this work. See (1933) Op. Att'y. Gen. Ohio No. 80o.
The recent construction of university dormitories at Ohio State University and else-
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the construction, extension and improvement of institutions devoted to
the care and treatment of maladjusted groups. Insanity has been on the
increase in recent years; care of the epileptic and the feeble-minded for
various reasons requires extended facilities. Yet existing institutions are
considerably overcrowded and unable to meet the demands of the newer
cases. Some of these are housed in private hospitals; the remainder go
and come at will, mingling with the normal citizenry, although in
desperate need of treatment and confinement." The necessity for some
solution cannot be gainsaid, nor can the impossibility of appropriating
from the general budget the sums needed for the immediate realization
of these types of improvements.
Faced with this seeming impasse, the state's legislators pondered the
possibility of applying to these pressing areas of need the theory of the
Kasch debt limitation escape. With respect to institutions for the feeble-
minded, epileptic and tubercular, the analogy seemed to fit perfectly, for
by statute the State of Ohio places the cost of care primarily upon
family and/or friends and secondarily upon the counties from which
these patients come.19 In the case of the insane, the primary incidence of
the cost is the same, but it is the state itself which is secondarily responsi-
ble." 9 This possibility of state liability, to be met presumably from tax
revenues, except for funds derived from sale of institutional products,
becomes primary in the case of those committed for criminal acts; there
is no "pay-patients" law for criminals.
With this set-up, the Legislature enacted in 1938, with amendments
the year following, the Public Institutional Building Authority Act.2 '
The purpose of the act was declared to be "the construction, equipment
where in Ohio, the bonds to be paid off from student charges, is predicated on the Kasch
doctrine. See OHIo G. C. Sec. 7923-1, as amended by IIS v. S. 39 (1939). Compare
Baker v. Carter, 16S Okla. 116, zS P. (7d) 747) (1933); Fanning v. Univ. of Minne-
sota, x83 Minn. 222 (i931).
In February of this year the Ohio Supreme Court sustained Ohio legislation
authorizing the State Bridge Commission to acquire and operate toll bridges, the cost
of acquisition and improvement to be met by revenue bonds. State ex Tel. State Bridge
Comm. v. Griffith, 136 Ohio St. 334, 25 N.E. (2d) 847, 16 Ohio Op. 467 (940), cited
note li, supra.
"From an interview at the offices of the Public Institutional Building Authority.
The plight of the State is revealed in the emergency clause of the Act which created
the Authority. It is declared by OHIO G.C. 2332-11 (3): "This act is hereby declared
to be an emergency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health and safety. The reason therefor lies in facts which two-thirds of all the members
elected to each branch of the general assembly have considered, found and determined
and which are as follows: the facilities of many of the benevolent institutions of the
state have become so inadequate as seriously affect the ability of the state to care for the
inmates of such institutions requiring immediate efforts to remedy the situation, therefore
this act shall go into immediate effect."
"See OHIO G.C. Sec. ixSs-i to xSxi-i4, inclusive.
mSee OHIo G.C. Secs. 289o-46. i8xs.
'Ohio Laws, 117 v. 886, as amended in I8 v. S. B. 33 (1939)
and improvement of buildings for the use of benevolent, penal and re-
formatory state institutions."" All lands employed were to be state
property, the Authority to secure in them a possessory estate for
tventy-five years.25 Construction cost was to be met through bond issues
up to $io,ooo,ooo which, while made in the name of the State of Ohio,
would be obligations solely of the Authority.24 Servicing of these bonds
was to be effected by the payment to the Authority of specified rentals
for the use of the facilities thus afforded particular state departments;
these rentals, in turn, were to come from any available departmental
income. Sections 2332-4 and 2332-6 carried general provisions to this
effect, while Section 2332-3a provided specially for agreements of such
tenor to be undertaken between the Department of Public Welfare and
the Authority looking to the betterment of hospital facilities for the care
of patients and inmates under the department's control.2  Elaborate
provisions were included covering the issuance and nature of the bonds,28
and the rights and remedies of the bondholders. 27  For the protection
of the latter, the act authorized appointment of a trustee on application
of holders of tventy-five per centum in principal amount of outstanding
bonds; the trustee was empowered to bring all necessary actions required
by the creditors' interests, and was declared entitled as of right to the
appointment of a receiver who might take over and operate the default-
ing properties of the Authority.
Initial efforts under the Institutional Building Authority Act were
directed to a $7,5oo,ooo construction program looking to the enlarge-
ment and improvement of ten existing state hospitals and institutional
buildings devoted to the care of the feeble-minded. All appropriate
action was taken by the Authority up to the point of attestation of the
bonds by the Secretary of State. To test the constitutional theory under-
lying the act, this official refused to attest the bonds. The Authority
then brought in the Ohio Supreme Court an original action in man-
damus. Judge Day dissenting, the state's high court found Sections
2332-3a, 2332-4, and 2332-5 of the act "unconstitutional and void in
so far as they authorize the transfer of income producing property of the
state to the Authority, the rentals from which are to service the bonds
-,Oio G.C. Sec. 2332-2.
3Osio G.C. Sec. 2332-5.
" Osro G.C. Sec. 2332-4.
5The language of G.C. § 2332-3a is as follows: "... During the term of any such
agreement or agreements for such use occupancy and maintenance the department of
public welfare is hereby authorized and required to :x the amount or amounts to be
charged for the support of patients and inmates of the hospitals under control of said
department of public welfare so as to be sufficient in the aggregate to provide available
agreements... .'SOseo G.C. Sec. 2332-7.
7Osebo G.C. Sec. 2332-8.
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issued by the Authority."2  The importance of this decision on the
meaning and scope of Article VIII, Sec. I, merits close analysis of the
reasoning upon which it is based.
The doctrine of Kasch v. Miller the court reaffirmed; the difficulty
in the present case, declared the majority, lay in the fact that receipts
from hospital operation were not unequivocally made the sole source of
payment. This was clear both from the agreement between the Author-
ity and bondholders and from that between the Authority and the
Department of Public Welfare. It had been made an absolute condition
of the latter contract that the Department would pay as rental the fixed
sum of $421,500 per year. Such a provision does differ from that em-
ployed in the financing of municipal utility plants, where there is a pledge
only of operating revenue after deduction of all operating expenses, an
amount that fluctuates in accordance with prevailing economic condi-
tions."9 While this possibility of state financial involvement may well
have been sufficient to justify the court in throwing the burden upon
the draftsmen of the basic agreement between Department and Author-
ity, there appears to have been slight probability that the state could be
compromised. For under the Ohio "pay-patients" law, amounts paid by
families and friends in 1938 totaled $35,000 in the case of the feeble-
minded, $26,ooo for epileptics, and $521,000 in the case of the insane.
County payments for support of the first two groups aggregated $578,-
000.0 Sources other than the State of Ohio thus amply guaranteed
payment of the $421,5oo rental charge fixed in the agreement.
The court, however, saw still another possibility by which the state
might become involved. Because the private and county payments go
direct to the state treasury and are then appropriated out to the Welfare
Department, there is present the chance of legislative diversion of these
monies. Segregation occurs only with respect to monies in the hands of
the Authority. 1 In the Kasch situation, on the other hand, the revenues
derived from the sale or lease of water and power reached the state
treasurer, not as part of the general funds subject to appropriation but as
a special deposit known as the water conservation fund. Although a
majority of the courts adhere to this distinction, declaring that only
where a fund is segregated is an obligation payable therefrom not within
"'State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 6o4,
6z3, 2z N.E. (zd) zoo, zoS, 14 Ohio Op. 533, 541 (1939).
'Alabama State Bridge Corp. v. Smith, 27 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695 (gz8), held:
"They (referring to the bridge corporation created by the legislature) only pledged the
surplus of several funds without any guaranty that there should be such surplus."
' Figures secured from the office of counsel for the Institutional Building Authority.
3 OHo G.C. Sec. 2332-9.
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the debt limitation maxima,32 actual differences in administration consist
solely in the maintenance in the one situation of separate entries. A more
fundamental distinction does, however, exist between the utility situation
and that before the court in the Griffith litigation. With the former,
government has truly entered the market place; the arrangements it
makes are purely contractual, the exaction paid for the services it renders
is technically a price. Care of the mentally sick and incompetent is
conducted on another plane; government there is something more than
a trade, and payment is a matter of compulsion. In this broader sense
there is a degree of state involvement in the Griffith fact-pattern not
present in that of Kasch v. Miller, a greater immediacy transcending
differences between general and segregated funds.
A judgment intuitive of similar tenor seemingly carried the day with
respect to the eventuality of default. The statutory scheme challenged in
Kasch v. Miller gave to bondholders the right of foreclosure and to the
purchaser at foreclosure the entire interests of the state for twenty-five
years. Yet the court found nothing in that to view with alarm. Quite
different was the court's reaction to analogous provisions in the Building
Authority Act designed to afford adequate protection to bondholders.
"Clearly such receiver would have the same right and powers as
receivers generally have and are given by the court as to custody of
property for the benefit of creditors in cases of insolvency. Undoubtedly,
such receiver, representing the creditor bondholders, would be authorized
to operate the property independently and exclusively, and would not be
obliged to deal with the defaulting Welfare Department for the use of
the same. In ordinary course, unless the state in some way came to the
rescue to redeem its property, the receiver could bring about a sale of
the remainder of the leasehold estate of the Authority in these properties,
to liquidate the bonds."3 3 It is one thing to permit operation of utility
or analogous enterprises in the interests of frustrated creditors; it is
quite another to contemplate private management of a considerable por-
tion of the state's hospitalization activities for the avowed purpose of
bondholder rather than patient welfare. If the decision in the Griffith
case flows from a judicial reaction to such a distinction, then the court's
present temperament will require, if the Kasch escape is to be workable
in the remaining areas of need, a diminution in bondholder protection
that might well make the obligations unmarketable.
'Joliet v. Alexander , 194 IIL 457, 6z N.E. 861, soo A.L.R. goo (igo2). In State
College Development Ass'n. v. Nisser, 66 .D. z87, 281 N.V. 907 (1938), it was said: "If
the political subdivision is obligated directly or indirectly to feed the special fund from
general or other revenues in addition to those arising solely from the specific improve-
ment, then a debt is created."
=Sqpra, note ZS, at 622-623, 22 N.E. (ad) at acS.
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It is possible, however, that the Griffith hostility toward the bond-
holder protective provisions was in final result predicated upon the union
of new and existing structures in the plan before the court. The actual
decision in the case would seem to bear this out; Section 2332-8 was
not declared invalid, and subsections 3a, 4, and 5 were stricken down
only to the extent they authorized "the transfer of income-producing
property of the state to the Authority, the rentals from which are to
service the bonds issued by the Authority."34 Such an interpretation bot-
toms the Authority's contentions in the current litigation between it and
Neffner, now before the Supreme Court on demurrer." The plan at
issue in this latest effort to relieve the undeniable needs of the state, calls
for a $4,500,000 bond issue for the erection of an entirely new and
separate institution for the feeble-minded. Thus should default occur,
all that could be lost would be the equity in the property resulting from
payments made before default. Although this loss might be quite large,
the courts take no account of such a factor; physical severance prevents
the forfeiture of a structure erected with tax revenues.
Physical severance is also counted upon in the Neffner case to over-
come another major basis of judicial criticism of the Griffith set-up. "By
the great weight of authority," declared the majority in the Griffith de-
cision, "bonds issued by a state or municipality, with the proceeds of which
some addition is to be constructed or added to public property, which
bonds by agreement are to be liquidated solely and exclusively from the
revenues of the entire property, old as well as new, constitute a debt or
an indebtedness of the state or municipality as the case may be."3 The
authorities cited for this proposition go upon the theory that the pledging
of revenues derived from already existing properties, by diverting such
monies from their regular channel of general appropriation, indirectly
increases the burden of the beleaguered taxpayer, who must then make
up the difference. Physical severance alone will not correct for this;
to meet this objection it would seem essential that there be fiscal sever-
ance as well. For only by the construction of separate buildings and the
pledging of the income from these new facilities could the threat
to the taxpayer be completely eliminated under this theory.3"
See note z8, supra.
"State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v. Neffner. Hearing on de-
murrer was held May 7, but no decision had been rendered at the date of this issue.
'Supra, note 28, at 616, zz N.E. (zd) at zo-zo6.
'Schnell v. Rock Island, 232 Ill. 89, 83 N.E. 46z, 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) 874 (907)3
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. (zd) 144- (1933).
"Physical severance could be dispensed with if appeal were had to cost accounting
techniques by which an apportionment could be made between the revenue capacity of the
old and the new. A few courts have approved this. See Legis. (1933) z8 IowA L. Rev.
269, 277, n. 42.
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Not only does this theory of union of properties force complete
severance as the price of satisfying Article VIII, Sec. i qua debt limita-
tion; by preventing the diversion of funds derived from existing functions
it makes of that constitutional provision a sort of indirect tax rate limita-
tion. This may possibly explain Judge Day's dissent from all of the
Griffith decision save its reaffirmation of Kasch v. Miller. For in State
ex rel. Portsmouth v. Kountz, " he had declared that "In the absence
of a specific tax limitation, a constitutional provision limiting the power
to create debts does not operate as a limitation on the taxing power of a
municipality. However, constitutional provision imposing a tax limit, by
implication, does impose a debt limit, on the theory that the greater in-
cludes the lesser, that the power to spend is circumscribed by the power to
collect."'" Such a view as to the nature of debt maxima would seem to
stand the historical test of the intent of those who framed Ohio's funda-
mental law in 185 1. Those delegates diagnosed the fiscal ills that were
before them as essentially twofold; and there is little basis for believing
that they conjoined the two for purposes of treatment save in the recog-
nition of the fact to which Judge Day refers, that a tax limit indirectly
operates to deter borrowing.4
Despite this background, the Griffith court found Ohio to be in
accord with the weighty authority from outside because of the court's
disposition of a "similar situation in the case of Village of Brewster v.
Hill . ,,." Passed over was a court of appeals decision in Pathi v.
Donaldson,4 3 where the financing of a light plant extension from earn-
ings of the whole enterprise was assumed to be consistent with Article
XVIII, Sec. I2 of the Ohio Constitution. That provision, as before
noted," specifically approves for municipal utility financing the Kasch
escape from general debt maxima. Brewster v. Hill,4" on the other
hand, involved the interpretation of Article VIII, Sec. 6, the lending
of credit prohibition adopted in 185 1 as part of the policy of restricting
the amount of governmental spending.4" Even in its own sphere, the
Brezster case has been criticized in the pages of this Journal for its
puzzling theory that a municipal corporation, in purchasing a plant ex-
tension out of total earnings, somehow becomes the creditor-lender in the
transaction rather than the debtor." But strange as this may be, the
"I x29 Ohio St. 272, x94 N.E. 869, z Ohio Op. 161, 97 A.L.R. 1o99 (1935).
"Id. at 276-277, 194 N.E. at S71-87z.
"'See Note (1903) 16 HARv. L. REv. 442.
'Supra, note 2S, at 617, 2z N.E. (2d) at z6o.
d329 Ohio App. 171, 163 N.E. zo4., 6 Ohio L. Abs. 562 (gzS).
* See note 9, supra.
Szg Ohio St. 343, 590 N.E. 766 (1934).
" See discussion at p. 298, supra.
'
7 Note (1935) 1 O.S.L.J. 55.
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court puts all sleight-of-hand performers to shame in deducing in the
Gri fith case that "By the same token, when it loaned its financial credit,
it made itself indebted to the seller."'48 The public is not allowed to
learn the magic by which a municipality purchasing on time payments is
first transformed into a creditor only to then be reclassed a debtor. Yet
on the strength of this deduction, the court concluded "that if the bonds
in this case are issued as contemplated, the state not only lends its credit
by the contribution of its property in esse but becomes indirectly indebted
on account of these bonds."49 Here would seem to lie the weakest link
in the chain of reasoning by which Ohio's high court invalidated the first
effort made under the Building Authority Act. But that court's opinion
and decision in the Griffith litigation gives evidence that on this very
matter will come the greatest judicial resistance to further efforts to
find a solution through the general technique contemplated in that
legislation. J.M.H.
CORPORATIONS
CORPORATIONS - SALES OF ASSETS - PRESUMPTION OF FAIR
VALUE FAVORING DEMANDS OF DISSENTERS
The early American corporation was a small enterprise with a
simple financial structure and few stockholders, most of whom were
actively engaged in the management of the business. In most jurisdic-
tions, a majority of the stockholders of a solvent corporation were
denied the power to transfer all of its property,' effect a consolidation
or merger,2 or bring about fundamental changes in the financial struc-
ture,3 as against the dissent of a single stockholder.
These common law rules were inadequate to meet the changing
needs of the modern corporate system. It became apparent that majority
shareholders were too greatly restricted if sweeping changes in corporate
structure were to be carried out with efficiency and dispatch; greater
" Supra, note -8, at 617, 2z N.E. (zd) at zo6.
9 ib id.
'Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., Io Del. Ch. 371 (19 1); Abbott v. American
Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. Ch. 578 (N.Y. 1861); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401
(1853), (often cited as a leading case denying to the majority the right to sell. The
decision was perhaps influenced by the fact that the corporation involved was a railroad,
and a quasi-public corporation); 3 CooF, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) sec. 670; 13
FL.TCnER, CYC. CORP. (PERM. En.) sec. 5797. Contra: Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 73 Mass. 393, 66 Am. Dec. 490 (S856); see Warren, Transfers of Corporate Under-
takings (1917) 30 HARv. L. R-v. 335..
2 Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34- Ariz. 245, 270 Pac. bo44, rehearing
denied, 34 Ariz. 482, 272 Pac. 918 (x928); Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 75 N.J. Eq.
2Z9, 72 Atl. xz6, i9 Ann. Cases 1262 (gog).
'Kent v. The Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879).
